Photo: Geopolitical map of Europe, author: Hidalgo, Pixabay
Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has accelerated the efforts of the Baltic states to extricate themselves from the Moscow-controlled BRELL power grid system. Despite facing synchronization issues and energy quota challenges, these nations have abandoned their ties with Russia. In this context, Poland could play a crucial role in ensuring their independence from the Putin regime if the planned nuclear power plant becomes a reality.
The Brell power grid system was based on a 2001 agreement that focused on technical aspects of electricity transmission and operates synchronously with the US/IPS zone, which includes Russia, Belarus, and the CIS countries. Despite the collapse of communism in Russia and a political desire to join the European Union, former Soviet Union republics that exited Russian control had to secure energy flows. The power grid of these countries constitutes lines featuring voltage from 110kV to 330kV, while the regional network primarily consists of 110kV lines. Together with neighbouring electrical networks of Russia and Belarus, the electrical networks of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania form the “Baltic ring,” comprising 330 kV and 750 kV lines.
The Russian power system provided primary power reserves needed to maintain the frequency of electricity flow in line with EU requirements. For example, Poland’s average voltage was 220 kV (currently 230 kV), which is typical for the entire EU with 50 Hz frequency of electricity flow (UCTE system’s highest voltage is also 380 kV instead of 1,150 kV top for power grids in the former Soviet Union). Thus, integration with systems of western countries like Germany, the Czech and Slovakia as well as connection with Sweden was simpler for Poland and less cost sensitive. Poland was part of the EU UCTE electricity network almost 10 years before official accession. Among the Baltic, only Estonia’s electricity supply situation is close to western standards lines with the presence of 220 kV. This has enabled integration with the Nordic grid, particularly Finland. Estonia is able to cater to peak loads and also facilitate net export of energy to Latvia and Russia — and even back to Finland in case of favourable electricity prices. Latvia has connections with Estonia and Russia, which result in considerable dependence on imports from these countries, though the country is a net exporter to Lithuania.
Among the three Baltic states, Lithuania is most vulnerable in terms of power demand in relation to supply. This is an effect of the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant decommissioning (1500MW capacity) – a critical condition of EU accession. Ignalina produced almost 40 percent of the electricity consumed in the Baltic states. The shutdown caused a substantial power shortage in Lithuania of about 150-180 MW generation capacity during the winter peak demand in 2014 and a 130-160 MW deficit during the summer peak, according to Gianluca Fulli in the Politecnico di Torino doctorate thesis. The European Commission’s economic snapshot of Lithuania from 2023 says the country is importing around two-thirds of its electricity due to insufficient domestic power generation. The amounts are lower than in 2013, when the country had to import 70 percent of the electricity consumed, and 50 percent originated from third countries. Still, the situation leads to high energy prices and inflation. This is why Lithuania is struggling to meet the aim of increasing the generation of electricity from renewable sources to 70 percent of the total domestic consumption by 2030 and 100 percent in 2045 after a ban on a new nuclear power plant in Visaginas.
In the meantime, in 2015, Lithuania secured 500 MW of electricity transmission capacity in both directions via a connection with Poland that was seen as a country politically willing and militarily capable of facing up to coercion, according to the Baltic States report of the International Centre for Defence and Security. Russia is well-known for using energy as a tool of pressure. Before the Ukrainian war, in 2021, Lithuania used the link with Poland for electricity exports, while substantial amounts of electricity came from a cable of 700 MW capacity connecting it with Sweden. Imports from Poland in 2021 accounted for 31 percent of Lithuania’s power imports, in line with Tomas Janeliunas’s report for the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Foundation.
After the Ukrainian war started and the so-called rejection of Russian energy by the EU in solidarity with Kyiv, Lithuania still had a green light to import electricity from Kaliningrad. In 2021, power from this source accounted for 16 percent of Lithuanian electricity imports. The capacity of the connection allowing for import from Kaliningrad to Lithuania is 600 MW, and for exports it is 680 MW. The electricity import capacity decreased to 150 MW for Lithuania after Russian aggression against Ukraine. Yet, imports continued as per Tomas Janeliunas. Russian electricity exports have been transmitted through a part of the European electricity systems, according to a statement of The Forum for Research on Eastern Europe and Emerging Economies (Free Network). Apart from Latvia, which has one connection with Russia on the border (its import capacity has also decreased after the war in Ukraine started), Lithuania has four connecting points with Belarus, which is a part of the Brell grid. This is why, as Free Network stated in November 2022, some eight months after the war began, desynchronization from the Brell network is not currently feasible. The Baltic was still receiving Russian or Belarusian energy. Moreover, during 2023, two years after hostilities broke out, Lithuania’s electricity imports from Poland amounted to USD 106 million, while Poland’s imports from Lithuania exceeded USD 307 million, according to the UN database.
The case for desynchronization from the Brell system by European Union members was not new. The process sped up after the Russian aggression. Technical problems, tensions between countries, and costly investments needed to join the European Union electricity network in order to fully abandon the Soviet era ties have extended the process, which is not easy to complete. The first strong signals of disconnection appeared after the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Before the war against Georgia, Russia was perceived as a “partner” by many countries of the EU and NATO. Crimea annexation and the ongoing war in Donbas changed the perception, and Russia is seen as a threat to Western countries. The 2018 agreement between the Baltic states and Poland — which is supporting the Brell desynchronization — aimed to reach the goal by late 2025, although it has already happened, however, with a three-year transition period. Disconnection would, though, isolate Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave with a window to the Baltic Sea, and Russia has been aware that this is a threat to its interests. The country has been playing its own games with Baltic states and the European Union (energy supply disruptions to some countries, disinformation, cyber-warfare, political and economic corruption, military threats), and at the same time, it is securing its interests in electricity supply for the region. It has been modernizing the transmission grids in Kaliningrad, equipping the region with new power generating capacities, expanding generation and transmission capacities in the North-West (Sankt Petersburg).
In practice, as the Baltic Security and Strategy report from 2019 states, the Russian government has accepted the prospect of Brell exit. As long as the Baltic states display a strong will to get rid of the Brell network, Russia may not be able to use electricity as a tool of political and economic pressure. Moreover, among the Baltic, only Lithuania has been highly dependent on Russian electricity, as Latvia has hydroelectric power. Disconnection from the Brell system may be a problem for the European Union (particularly Finland, Sweden, and Poland) though accession of Sweden to NATO may change perceptions. Russia cut off the power supply to Finland after the war in Ukraine started and the latter declared its willingness to join NATO. On the other hand, Finland has become a part of NATO along with Sweden. Meanwhile, Russian electricity exports to Lithuania, which is also a NATO member, continued.
In this context, Poland’s role with its planned nuclear power plant may be crucial to secure electricity for the Baltic under the condition that Lithuania and others are going to access substantial amounts of power. Before the Ukrainian war, Poland was reluctant to build a second overland interconnector to the Baltic states. The country is also blocking the opening of its domestic electricity market to competition from other EU members and limits imports from the east (Baltics) in order to protect local power production, still mainly generated from coal. But the political decision within the EU to abandon coal has been made. Poland, anyway, needs to secure its demand for energy,y which is temporarily declining due to high prices. Nuclear power is considered clean energy in what matters from the EU perspective. This is why the new nuclear power plant in Poland may get the EU green light in contrast to the past one planned in Żarnowiec, which was almost completely ready to launch the works (the political decision of the first Polish fully democratically elected government halted it). Still, energy security costs, and Poland is struggling to establish a reference price for nuclear power in the EU. That means, if the EU agrees, the domestic economy’s requirement to adjust to new conditions will remain limited, and prices, particularly in a closed market, may not surge and remain affordable. In this context, spare production might be sold outside, possibly to Baltic states and notably Lithuania, after the Brell system is disconnected. But the question of whether Russia moves against the West, as seen in Ukraine, military threats to NATO, and the recent election in the US, may help Poland’s nuclear plans as the EU recognizes the need for Warsaw and the Baltic to secure energy supplies.
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